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INTRODUCTION
Take a quick glance at the magazine racks in any supermarket
or convenience store, and the faces of celebrities, smiling or not,
will stare right back at you. Sign online and you will see these
same faces on numerous gossip websites and blogs, which appear
to be updated with new stories and photographs almost every two
seconds. 1 In 1890, Louis Brandeis and Samuel Warren observed,
“[t]he press is overstepping in every direction the obvious bounds
of propriety and decency. Gossip is no longer the resource of the
idle and of the vicious, but has become a trade, which is pursued
with industry as well as effrontery.” 2 Never in their wildest
dreams, or, more appropriately, nightmares, could Warren and
Brandeis have imagined how large the gossip “trade” would grow.
Today, the paparazzi go to unprecedented lengths to obtain
photographs of celebrities that may be sold to the tabloids for an
increasingly hefty compensation. 3 In an effort to restrain the

1

See, e.g., US Weekly Online, http://www.usmagazine.com/blog/.
Louis D. Brandeis & Samuel D. Warren, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193,
196 (1890).
3
See infra Part I.
2
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paparazzi 4 following recent incidents, 5 California passed AB 381.
California lawmakers justified the enactment of the new law on the
ground that it is the only way to protect celebrities and the public
from the paparazzi. AB 381 would do this by eliminating the
paparazzi’s economic incentive to go to extraordinary lengths to
obtain photographs of celebrities. 6 However, the United States
Supreme Court has held laws that single out the press for
differential treatment and target a specific portion of the media to
be presumptively unconstitutional. 7 The presumption may only be
overcome by a showing that the law serves a compelling state
interest that cannot be protected in the absence of the regulation. 8
The question therefore becomes: Are the protections of celebrity
privacy and safety, as well as public safety, compelling state
interests that justify the enactment of AB 381, a law that on its face
subjects the press to differential treatment and specifically targets
the paparazzi?
This Note addresses the relationship between celebrity privacy
rights, the press’s right to gather news, and the government’s
ability to regulate this relationship through the enactment of
legislation prohibiting so-called newsgathering torts. Part I
examines the history and policy surrounding celebrity privacy
rights and anti-paparazzi legislation, including the events that
prompted the enactment of AB 381. Part II discusses the split
among the courts regarding whether to impose liability for
newsgathering torts. Part III argues that the Fourth Circuit’s
opinion in Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. indicates
that a law that imposes liability for newsgathering torts will not
survive a constitutional challenge if the law singles out the press
and specifically targets a limited portion of the media, unless the
law serves a compelling state interest that cannot be protected in its
absence. 9 Part III also argues that AB 381 will not survive a
4

See infra Part I.
See infra Part I.
6
See infra Part I.
7
Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 585
(1983).
8
Id.
9
194 F. 3d. 505, 520–22 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding that reporters were liable in tort for
employee disloyalty and trespass committed during the newsgathering process where the
5
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constitutional challenge since (1) the law is discriminatory on its
face and (2) it does not serve a compelling state interest because
(a) current assault law provides an adequate remedy for outrageous
paparazzi behavior, (b) the tabloids can police themselves, and (c)
there is a limited market for pictures obtained through the use of
dangerous tactics.
I. FROM ROYALTY TO RODEO: THE HISTORY AND POLICY BEHIND
AB 381
When people think of the paparazzi, Princess Diana is one of
the first names that comes to mind. In August 1997, Princess
Diana and her boyfriend Dodi Fayed were killed in a car accident,
inside a Paris tunnel, while trying to elude a group of aggressive
paparazzi. 10 Princess Diana’s death prompted a worldwide
backlash against the paparazzi and spawned a movement to
prevent similar tragedies. 11 Members of Congress proposed a
number of bills to address the “paparazzi problem.” 12 Despite
such efforts, not a single one of the proposed federal bills reached
the floor of the House of Representatives or the Senate for a vote. 13
Although efforts to pass anti-paparazzi legislation failed at the
federal level, the State of California passed the nation’s first antipaparazzi statute in 1998. 14
Nearly a decade after Princess Diana’s tragic death, the
paparazzi have failed to refrain from their chases. In May 2005,
police arrested paparazzo Galo Ramirez on suspicion of assault
with a deadly weapon after Ramirez rammed his car into Lindsay

reporters secured jobs at a supermarket as a means to obtain information about the
supermarket’s unwholesome food handling practices for use in a television broadcast).
10
See Richard J. Curry, Jr., Diana’s Law, Celebrity and the Paparazzi: The Continuing
Search for a Solution¸ 18 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 945, 946 (2000).
11
See id. (arguing that anti-paparazzi statutes are not necessary because existing laws
effectively deal with abusive paparazzi behavior).
12
Id. at 948–51. The bills proposed included the Protection from Personal Intrusion
Act, the Privacy Protection Act of 1998, and the Personal Privacy Protection Act. Id.
13
Id. at 951.
14
Id.
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Lohan’s Mercedes while attempting to capture her photograph. 15
In August 2005, Scarlett Johansson sideswiped a car while trying
to elude four SUVs filled with paparazzi that had followed her for
over an hour from her Hollywood home to Disneyland.16 She
subsequently crashed into a vehicle carrying a woman and her two
young daughters. 17 Similarly, in September 2005, police cited
photographer Todd Wallace for two misdemeanor counts of assault
and battery after he assaulted two park employees while attempting
to photograph Reese Witherspoon and her two children during
their visit to Disneyland. 18 Some argue that these recent incidents
indicate that current laws fail to protect not only celebrities’
privacy, but the safety of celebrities and the general public as
well. 19
Spurred by the aforementioned incidents, on September 30,
2005, California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger approved AB
381. 20 AB 381 is an amendment to Section 1708.8 of the

15
Pamela McClintock, Governator Snaps Back at Paparazzi, DAILY VARIETY, Oct. 3,
2005, at 1. In December 2005, the Los Angeles County District Attorney decided that
there was insufficient evidence to charge Ramirez and thus dropped the charges. Rush,
George and Joanna Rush Molloy, It’s a Lush Life: Celebs Recall How They Got Drunk
With Success, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Dec. 30, 2005, at 28.
16
See That’s Hollywood; When Worlds Collide, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2005, at B18.
17
See id.
18
Internet Movie Database, Witherspoon Explains Paparazzi Campaign (Nov. 1, 2005),
http://www.imdb.com/news/wenn/2005-11-01. Witherspoon stated,
[t]hey do things that are illegal. They’ve hit my car and tried to push me off the
road. And they’ve blocked me in with their cars, which is false imprisonment.
They shout terrible obscene things at you and your children to try and get a
reaction on your face. I had one follow us to the pediatrician’s office shouting
the f-word at us. My daughter was only four—she was shaking and crying.
It’s hard to live with. And I don’t understand why it’s legal to print pictures of
my children.
Id.
In February 2006, Todd Wallace was found dead in his Brentwood home. He was never
arraigned in the Witherspoon case. See Sarah Hall, Reese’s Theme Park Photog Believed
Dead, EONLINE, Feb. 6, 2006, http://www.eonline.com/News/Items/0,1,18304,00.html.
19
See Harrison Sheppard, Photos Finished?; Bill Would Target Paparazzi, DAILY
NEWS OF L.A., July 24, 2005, at N1. “The bill is a follow-up to a state law passed in
1998—the year after Princess Diana was killed in a car crash following a chase by
paparazzi—that targeted and spelled out similar penalties for photographers who trespass
in pursuit of a photo.” Id.
20
2005 Cal. A.L.S. 424, 2005 Cal. AB 381, Stats. 2005 ch. 424.

KATZE_091706_CLEAN

1354

9/17/2006 5:45:50 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 16:1349

California Civil Code. 21 The law creates a cause of action against
those persons who commit assault with the intent to capture any
sort of visual image, sound recording or physical impression. 22
AB 381 provides that a person who commits such an assault is
liable for up to three times the amount of general and special
damages proximately caused by that violation and may also be
liable for punitive damages. 23 Furthermore, AB 381 provides that
if the assault is proven to have been committed for a commercial
purpose, any proceeds or consideration obtained as a result of that
violation are subject to disgorgement to the plaintiff. 24 AB 381
also imposes liability on “[a] person who directs, solicits, actually
induces or actually causes another person, regardless of whether
21

Id.; see Cal. Civ. Code § 1708.8 (2006). This provision establishes two causes of
action. The first cause of action is for physical invasion of privacy which occurs when
the
defendant knowingly enters the land of another without permission or
otherwise committed a trespass in order to physically invade the privacy of the
plaintiff with the intent to capture any type of visual image, sound recording, or
other physical impression of the plaintiff engaging in a personal or familial
activity and the physical invasion occurs in a manner that is offensive to a
reasonable person.
Cal. Civ. Code § 1708.8(a) (2006).
The second cause of action is for constructive invasion of privacy which occurs when the
defendant attempts to capture, in a manner that is offensive to a reasonable
person, any type of visual image, sound recording, or other physical impression
of the plaintiff engaging in a personal or familial activity under circumstances
in which the plaintiff had a reasonable expectation of privacy, through the use
of a visual or auditory enhancing device, regardless of whether there is a
physical trespass, if this image, sound recording, or other physical impression
could not have been achieved without a trespass unless the visual or auditory
enhancing device was used.
Id. at § 1708.8(b).
22
Cal. Civ. Code § 1708.8(c) (2006). This provision prohibits “[a]n assault committed
with the intent to capture any type of visual image, sound recording or other physical
impression of the plaintiff is subject to subdivisions (d), (e), and (h).” Id.
23
Id. at § 1708.8(d). This provision establishes that
[a] person who commits any act described in subdivision . . . (c) is liable for up
to three times the amount of any general and special damages that are
proximately caused by the violation of this section. This person may also be
liable for punitive damages, subject to proof according to Section 3294.
Id.
24
Id. This provision establishes that “[i]f the plaintiff proves that the invasion of
privacy was committed for a commercial purpose, the defendant shall also be subject to
disgorgement to the plaintiff of any proceeds or other consideration obtained as a result
of the violation of this section.”
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there is an employer-employee relationship,” to commit an assault
with the intent to capture any sort of visual image, sound recording
or physical impression. 25 By enacting AB 381, the State of
California sought to restrain the paparazzi by creating a
disincentive for the paparazzi to go to extraordinary lengths to
photograph celebrities. 26
Whether in the traditional tabloids such as The National
Enquirer or in “celebrity weeklies” such as Us Weekly, the market
for paparazzi photographs continues to flourish. With some
paparazzi photographs selling for exorbitant amounts of money, 27
some argue that the only way to protect celebrities from the
increasingly aggressive onslaught of the paparazzi is by
eliminating the economic incentive for the paparazzi to take any
means necessary to obtain the perfect picture. 28 Nonetheless,
25

Id. at § 1708.8(e). This provision establishes that
[a] person who directs, solicits, actually induces, or actually causes another
person, regardless of whether there is an employer-employee relationship to
[commit an assault with the intent to capture a visual image, sound recording or
other physical impression] is liable for any general, special, and consequential
damages resulting from each said violation. In addition, the person that directs,
solicits, instigates, induces, or otherwise causes another person, regardless of
whether there is an employer-employee relationship, to violate this section shall
be liable for punitive damages.

Id.
26

See 2005 Cal. A.L.S. 424, 2005 Cal. AB 381, Stats. 2005 ch. 424; AB 381 Bill
Analysis, at 4, available at http://www.aroundthecapitol.com/billtrack/analysis.html?file=
ab_381_cfa_20050714_095213_sen_comm.html (last visited July. 8, 2006) [hereinafter
AB 381 Bill Analysis]. Assemblywoman Cindy Montañez, the author of AB 381, wrote,
[r]ecently, certain members of the press corps known as ‘paparazzi’ have taken
their profession of capturing the images of celebrities in a dangerous direction:
assaulting the celebrity in order to either capture the victim’s reaction to the
assault on film or tape, or to use the threat of assault to impede the mobility of a
celebrity so that an image may be taken. . . . And, the financial rewards of the
‘right’ celebrity photo can be an incentive for the [paparazzi] to continue to
push this trend.
Id.
27
See Paparazzi Moments Over the Years, COX NEWS SERVICE, Aug. 31, 2005. In
2002, a bidding war erupted between Us and People magazines over pictures of Jennifer
Lopez and Ben Affleck kissing. People got the photos for $100,000. Id. In 2004, a man
getting married in the same Las Vegas chapel as Britney Spears and her childhood friend
Jason Alexander takes pictures and sells them for $300,000. Id. In 2005, pictures of Brad
Pitt, Angelina Jolie and her son, Maddox, vacationing on a beach in Africa sold for
$500,000. Id.
28
See AB 381 Bill Analysis, supra note 26, at 4.
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despite the abundance of people who support AB 381, controversy
persists as to whether a change in the law is necessary at all, and if
it is, whether AB 381 is a reasonable solution. 29
The incidents involving Lindsay Lohan, Scarlett Johansson and
Reese Witherspoon reveal that the paparazzi’s actions can
endanger celebrities, their companions and members of the general
public, particularly those in California. 30
Nonetheless, the
incidents do not necessarily justify the creation of legislation that
singles out the press and specifically targets the paparazzi. To pass
constitutional muster, AB 381 must serve a compelling state
interest that cannot be achieved without the regulation. 31 This
standard is not easily satisfied.
A. Is Anything Sacred?: Celebrity Privacy Rights under
California Law
AB 381 may override the presumption of unconstitutionality
only if the law serves a compelling state interest that cannot be
achieved without the regulation. 32
Courts must therefore
determine whether protecting celebrity privacy, celebrity safety
and the safety of the general public are compelling state interests
that cannot be protected in the absence of AB 381. The courts
continue to struggle with providing protection for personal privacy
without infringing on the freedom of the press. 33 As the Supreme
Court of California stated in Shulman v. Group W Productions,
Inc., “it has long been apparent that the desire for privacy must at
many points give way before our right to know, and the news
29

See Parts I–II.
See supra notes 15–18 and accompanying text.
31
Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 585
(1983).
32
Id.
33
Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 477 (Cal. 1998) (holding that the
broadcast of an accident victims’ rescue from a serious accident could not be the basis for
tort liability under a private facts claim because it was newsworthy as a matter of law;
that triable issues of fact existed as to whether reporters invaded a woman’s privacy when
they accompanied her in the rescue helicopter and as to whether the reporters tortiously
intruded into the woman’s privacy when they listened to confidential conversations with
a nurse at the rescue scene, without the woman’s consent; and that members of the press
did not have a First Amendment privilege to intrude on plaintiffs’ seclusion and private
communications).
30
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media’s right to investigate and relate, facts about the events and
individuals of our time.” 34 The conflict between personal privacy
and freedom of the press fuels the controversy surrounding AB
381.
Over the years, both the federal and state courts have come to
recognize the existence of a right to privacy. 35 There are many
different types of privacy laws, including, but not limited to, the
common law tort, 36 the constitutional right of privacy protecting
rights to contraception 37 and abortion, 38 and other statutory rights
of privacy that address specific privacy issues such as the use of
personal data by the government. 39 The privacy laws generally
focus only on the common law tort. However, because privacy
jurisprudence developed alongside modern notions of free
expression, privacy jurisprudence is heavily influenced by First
Amendment theory. 40 Thus, it comes as no surprise that the
paparazzi’s First Amendment rights as members of the press
greatly shape celebrities’ right to privacy under California common
law.
1. California’s Common Law Right to Privacy
Celebrities argue that, like ordinary American citizens, they
have a right to privacy that should be protected from invasion by
the paparazzi. 41 However, celebrities do not possess the same
34

Id. at 474.
Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (finding a right to privacy implicit in the
Third Amendment’s prohibition against the quartering of soldiers, the Fourth
Amendment’s right of people to be secure in their persons, the Fifth Amendment’s right
against self-incrimination, and the Ninth Amendment’s right to retain rights not
enumerated in the Constitution); Melvin v. Reid, 297 P. 91 (Cal. 1931) (holding that the
use of a woman’s name in a movie about her life was an invasion of her right of privacy
guaranteed by the California Constitution); see Jamie E. Nordhaus, Celebrities’ Rights to
Privacy: How Far Should the Paparazzi Be Allowed to Go?, 18 REV. LITIG. 285, 287–88
(1999).
36
See infra notes 42–45; MARC A. FRANKLIN ET AL., MASS MEDIA LAW 365–67 (7th ed.
2005).
37
See Griswold, 112 Cal. App. 285.
38
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
39
5 U.S.C. § 552a(b) (2000).
40
See FRANKLIN ET AL., supra note 36, at 365–66.
41
See Liz Crokin, Chasing After Fame; Inside the Thrill, Mayhem of Photographing
Celebs, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 19, 2004, at 24. Kirsten Dunst acknowledged her frustration
35
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right to privacy as the average Joe (and not the average Joe who
has become more than average due to a reality television role)
because celebrities by trade throw themselves into the spotlight. 42
Some celebrities have a greater acceptance of the limits that fame
places on their privacy. George Clooney stated, “[i]t’s a tradeoff.
You just have to sort of steel yourself when you go out and know
that the walk to the market will be a more public event.” 43
Whatever a particular celebrity’s perception of the paparazzi
may be, celebrities undeniably do possess a right to privacy.
California recognizes a common law right to privacy, which
provides protection against four distinct categories of invasion as
identified by Dean Prosser: 44 (1) intrusion upon the plaintiff’s
seclusion or solitude, or into his private affairs; 45 (2) public
disclosure of embarrassing facts about the plaintiff; 46 (3) publicity
which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye; 47 and
(4) appropriation, for the defendant’s advantage, of the plaintiff’s
name or likeness. 48 The common law right to privacy recognized
by California, nevertheless, is far from absolute and remains
subject to qualification, particularly in the case of celebrities and

with the paparazzi’s intrusive behavior as she stated, “I don’t see how it can be a legal
thing to just take pictures of people in their everyday life.” Id.
42
See Nordhaus, supra note 35, at 289–92.
43
Liz Crokin, Chasing After Fame; Inside the Thrill, Mayhem of Photographing
Celebs, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 19, 2004, at 24.
44
FRANKLIN ET AL., supra note 36, at 365.
45
Sanchez-Scott v. Alza Pharms., 86 Cal. App. 4th 365 (2001) (holding that a breast
cancer patient had a sustainable cause of action for intrusion when the doctor allowed a
drug salesman to stay in the room during the woman’s examination without informing the
woman of the drug salesman occupation).
46
Porten v. Univ. of S.F., 64 Cal. App. 3d 825 (1976) (holding that a student’s
complaint against a university for disclosure of prior college transcripts to a loan
commission was a prima facie violation of the State’s constitutional right to privacy).
47
Eastwood v. Super. Ct. of L.A. County, 149 Cal. App. 3d 409 (1983) (holding that a
newspaper’s use of petitioner’s likeness to promote a false article could have infringed
petitioner’s right of publicity because a California statute provided no exemption for
publication of news known to be false).
48
Fairfield v. Am. Photocopy Equip., 291 P.2d 194 (Cal. 1955) (holding that an
invasion of a consumer’s right to privacy occurred when the seller of a product used the
consumer’s name in a print advertisement without the consumer’s permission).
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other public figures. 49 Despite what Us Weekly may imply,
celebrities are not just like us. 50
2. The Newsworthiness Limitation
A celebrity’s right to privacy is especially limited when that
celebrity enters a public place,51 and it is upon entering a public
place that the celebrity’s problems with the paparazzi arise.
However, even things that occur behind closed doors may not
qualify as private when they concern the lives of celebrities
because when the subject matter is of legitimate public interest,
courts limit an individual’s ability to bring a cause of action for
invasion of privacy. 52
In Kapellas v. Kofman, the Supreme Court of California
outlined the factors to consider when determining whether a
subject is newsworthy: (1) “the social value of the facts
published,” (2) “the depth of the article’s intrusion into ostensibly
private affairs,” and (3) “the extent to which the party voluntarily
acceded to a position of public notoriety.” 53 The court further
explained that as the legitimate public interest in the published
information became more “substantial,” greater intrusions into a
person’s private life would be allowed. 54 Nonetheless, while the
Kapellas court acknowledged the factors that the court should

49
See Carlisle v. Fawcett Publ’ns, Inc., 201 Cal. App. 2d 733 (1962) (holding that
because the marriage of the defendant actress with the plaintiff and the later annulment
were matters of public record there were no revelations of any intimate details which
would tend to outrage public decency and therefore there was no cause of action for an
invasion of his right of privacy).
50
Us Weekly contains a regular feature entitled “Stars—They’re Just Like Us.” The
feature typically contains pictures of celebrities engaged in everyday activities and
looking far from glamorous. See US Weekly Online, http://www.usmagazine.com/blog/
(click on “Quick Link” “Stars—They’re Just Like Us”).
51
See Nordhaus, supra note 35, at 302–03.
52
Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975) (holding that the cause of action for
invasion of privacy through public disclosure of the name of a rape victim imposed
sanctions on pure expression, the content of a publication).
53
Kapellas v. Kofman, 459 P.2d 912, 922–24 (Cal. 1969) (holding that a qualified First
Amendment newsworthiness privilege did not apply to a libel claim brought against the
publisher of an editorial that stated that a politician was not putting her children’s needs
first and that her performance as a mother was less than adequate).
54
Id. at 922.
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balance when determining a subject’s newsworthiness, 55 the
Shulman court made clear that the tastes or interests of an
individual judge or juror do not determine newsworthiness. 56
According to the Shulman court, a subject is newsworthy so long
as some reasonable members of the community could maintain a
legitimate interest in it. 57
Unfortunately for celebrities, “[o]ften, it is the intensely private
aspects of a celebrity’s life—involving drugs, sex or sexual
orientation, marital discord, issues with children or other family
members, or similar topics—that the public and the media deem
newsworthy. (Illegality only ratchets up the stakes, and increases
interest in the story.)” 58 While some may believe that a celebrity’s
sexual relationships or battles with addiction do not qualify as
newsworthy, the courts have taken a different view. 59 In Carlisle
v. Fawcett Publications, Inc., the Court of Appeal of California
acknowledged the existence of a public interest in the activities of
celebrities. 60 The court stated,

55

Id.
See Shulman v. Group W Prods., 955 P.2d 469, 485 (Cal. 1998).
57
Id. at 485–86.
58
Julie Hilden, Does Celebrity Destroy Privacy? Naomi Campbell and Narcotics
Apr.
2,
2002,
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/hilden/
Anonymous,
FINDLAW,
20020402.html.
59
See Eastwood v. Super. Ct. of L.A. County, 149 Cal. App. 3d 409, 423 (1983). The
court stated “[w]e have no doubt that the subject of the Enquirer article—the purported
romantic involvements of Eastwood with other celebrities—is a matter of public concern,
which would generally preclude the imposition of liability.” Id. In Gilbert v. National
Enquirer, Inc., 43 Cal. App. 4th 1135, 1149 (1996), the court reversed a preliminary
injunction restraining Melissa Gilbert’s ex-husband from disclosing allegedly defamatory
statements regarding Gilbert’s sexual relationships and substance abuse. The court
stated,
[a]s we previously indicated, information concerning Gilbert’s personal life is
newsworthy due to her celebrity status . . . . While Gilbert has not lost all of her
privacy rights by virtue of attaining celebrity status, the media attention
regarding her personal relationships has to some degree diminished the zone of
privacy surrounding those relationships.
Id.
60
See Carlisle v. Fawcett Publ’ns, Inc., 201 Cal. App. 2d 733, 746 (1962). The court
stated, “there is a public interest which attaches to people who by their accomplishments,
mode of living, professional standing or calling, create a legitimate and widespread
attention to their activities.” Id.
56
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[c]ertainly, the accomplishments and way of life of
those who have achieved a marked reputation or
notoriety by appearing before the public such as
actors and actresses, professional athletes, public
officers, noted inventors, explorers, war heroes,
may legitimately be mentioned and discussed in
print or on radio or television. Such public figures
have to some extent lost the right of privacy, and it
is proper to go further in dealing with their lives and
public activities than with those of entirely private
persons. 61
The Carlisle court suggested that a Faustian bargain exists—in
exchange for life as a celebrity, one must surrender one’s right to
privacy. 62
B. Reality Bites: Existing California Law and the Motivation
behind AB 381
The paparazzi, and the members of the press in general, have
much greater leeway when it comes to publishing and gathering
information about celebrities’ lives as a result of jurisprudence that
limits the ability to bring a cause of action for invasion of privacy
when the issue concerns a matter of public interest. 63 In addition
to using judicial limits placed on privacy as a means to obtain
information about the so-called private aspects of celebrities’ lives,
the paparazzi have also hidden behind such limits when accused of
overzealously pursuing celebrities and posing a danger to
celebrities and the general public. Privacy law, however, is not the
only source of law that can protect celebrities from the paparazzi.
61

Id. at 746–47.
Id.; see Camrin L. Crisci, All the World Is Not a Stage: Finding a Right to Privacy in
Existing and Proposed Legislation, 6 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 207, 210 (2002).
During the congressional hearings for the Personal Intrusion Act and the Privacy
Protection Act of 1998 Michael J. Fox stated,
I work very hard to entertain an audience, and when they enjoy my work, I am
deeply gratified. . . . I strongly disagree with those who would argue that some
sort of Faustian bargain has been struck whereby ‘public’ figures are fair game,
any time, any place, including within the confines of their own homes.
Id.
63
See supra Part I.B.1.
62
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Therefore, to determine whether AB 381 overcomes the
presumption of unconstitutionality it is necessary to examine
existing California law, including, but not limited to, privacy law,
as well as the motivation for AB 381’s enactment.
1. California Law—Assault, Trespass, Stalking and
Harassment
Supporters of AB 381 argue that recent incidents involving the
paparazzi indicate that existing statutes and the common law
provide celebrities with insufficient protection from the paparazzi
while in public places. 64 According to Assemblywoman Cindy
Montañez, “rare instances may produce criminal charges due to the
egregious nature of the assault, [but] many others go unpunished
due to the difficulty of proving criminal assault.” 65 In contrast,
opponents argue that AB 381 is unnecessary because current
assault law sufficiently protects celebrities from paparazzi who
break the law while in pursuit of a photograph. 66 As Peter Scheer,
the executive director of the California First Amendment
Coalition, stated, “[t]he behavior that’s described is an assault.
And you can sue somebody right now for an assault, and
somebody who assaults you can also be prosecuted.” 67
California’s trespass, stalking, and harassment laws, while
providing celebrities with protection against some predators, fail to
protect celebrities from the paparazzi. 68 Trespass laws do nothing
to shield celebrities from the prying eyes of the paparazzi while on
public property. 69 California Civil Code Section 1708.7 creates a
civil cause of action against stalking. However, since California’s
stalking law requires the plaintiff to prove that the defendant had
“the intent to place the plaintiff in reasonable fear for his or her
safety, or the safety of an immediate family member,” the law does

64

See Nordhaus, supra note 35, at 301–03.
See AB 381 Bill Analysis, supra note 26, at 4.
66
Harrison Sheppard, In the Sights of the Paparazzi: Assembly Bill Would Allow Stars
to Sue Aggressive Photographers, CAL. FIRST AMENDMENT COALITION, available at
http://www.cfac.org/Attachments/sue_paparazzi.htm (last visited Mar. 23, 2006).
67
Id.
68
See Nordhaus, supra note 35, at 301–03.
69
Id. at 301.
65
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not offer celebrities protection from the paparazzi because the
paparazzi’s intent is to capture an image.70
California’s
harassment statute eliminates the element of intent from stalking
statutes. 71 Nonetheless, the harassment statute contains its own
loophole as the law covers only harassment that “serves no
legitimate purpose.” 72
Since newsgathering is a legitimate
purpose, the harassment statute is unlikely to apply to the
paparazzi. 73
In the absence of provable criminal assault, celebrities have
limited recourse against the paparazzi when in public places
because, traditionally, courts have not considered the taking of an
individual’s photograph in a public place to constitute an invasion
of privacy. 74 Courts take the position that a celebrity, or any
person for that matter, effectively consents to the glare of the
public eye upon entering a public place. The photograph merely
makes a record of that which is already public. 75 Although
California’s common law right to privacy, as well as the State’s
trespass, stalking, and harassment laws, fail to protect celebrities
70

See Cal. Civ. Code § 1708.7(a)(3)(A) (2006) (emphasis added); Nordhaus, supra
note 35, at 302–03.
71
See Cal. Civ. Proc. § 527.6 (2005).
72
See id. at § 527.6(b); Nordhaus, supra note 35, at 303.
73
Nordhaus, supra note 35, at 303.
74
See generally Gill v. Hearst Publ’g Co., 253 P.2d 441, 443 (Cal. 1953) (reversing
defendant’s demurrer to an amended complaint that maintained that plaintiff’s cause of
action must rest solely on the publication of photographs without reference to the
accompanying text because the plaintiffs failed to make the allegation that defendant
consented to the publication of the article); see also Phillip E. Hassman, Taking
Unauthorized Photographs as Invasion of Privacy, 86 A.L.R.3d 374, 378–81 (2005).
75
Gill, 253 P.2d at 443–45. The court stated,
the mere publication of the photograph standing alone does not constitute an
actionable invasion of plaintiffs’ right of privacy. . . . The photograph of
plaintiffs merely permitted other members of the public, who were not at
plaintiffs’ place of business at the time it was taken, to see them as they had
voluntarily exhibited themselves. Consistent with their own voluntary
assumption of this particular pose in a public place, plaintiffs’ right to privacy
as to this photographed incident ceased and it in effect became a part of the
public domain, as to which they could not later rescind their waiver in an
attempt to assert a right of privacy. In short, the photograph did not disclose
anything which until then had been private, but rather only extended knowledge
of the particular incident to a somewhat larger public than had actually
witnessed it at the time of the occurrence.
Id.
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from the paparazzi while in public places, the paparazzi do not
have carte blanche to assault celebrities while in pursuit of a
photograph.
2. Meritless Defense?: The Misguided Motive behind AB 381
Proponents of AB 381 argue that the law will protect public
safety and celebrity privacy by eliminating the economic incentive
to go to dangerous lengths to obtain photographs of celebrities. 76
However, opponents believe that the State’s justification lacks
merit because there is a limited market for photographs obtained
through the use of dangerous tactics. 77 Frank Griffin, a longtime
celebrity photographer with Los Angeles-based Bauer-Griffin,
implied that Assemblywoman Montañez’s view of the situation
was somewhat misguided when he stated, “[y]ou’ve got this image
of photographers driving around like Mad Max with big battering
rams on their cars smashing into celebrities to take pictures of
them. . . . It doesn’t make any sense. It doesn’t happen in the real
world. It may happen in her (Montañez’s) imagination.” 78
According to Griffin, a paparazzo who crashes into a celebrity, or
otherwise assaults a celebrity, while trying to capture the
celebrity’s photograph will have difficulty selling the picture to a
major magazine, and thus has a limited incentive to engage in
dangerous and potentially harmful behavior. 79

76

Assemblywoman Montañez stated, “[t]his bill hits the paparazzi where it hurts—the
wallet. Money is their motivation, so taking away their money will be the solution.”
Legislation That Puts a “Freeze-Frame” on Aggressive Paparazzi Signed by Governor,
CAL. ST. ASSEMBLY DEMOCRATIC CAUCUS, Oct. 3, 2005, http://democrats.assembly.
ca.gov/templates/ademmain.asp?articleid=293&zoneid=2.
77
Harrison Sheppard, In the Sights of the Paparazzi: Assembly Bill Would Allow Stars
to Sue Aggressive Photographers, CAL. FIRST AMENDMENT COALITION, available at
http://www.cfac.org/Attachments/sue_paparazzi.htm (last visited Mar. 23, 2006). Griffin
stated, “[w]ho is going to buy the pictures of a celebrity having been crashed into by
rampant photographers?” Id.
78
Id.
79
Id.
Photographers who crash into a celebrity or otherwise assault them often have
difficulty selling that picture to major magazines . . . so they have little
financial incentive to engage in such behavior. The incidents are also relatively
rare.
Id.
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3. Self-Policing
Opponents of the AB 381 also believe the law is unnecessary
because the paparazzi and the tabloids can police themselves. One
tabloid in particular, Us Weekly, demonstrated its willingness to
change the situation in Los Angeles by banning pictures from
publication that were taken by photographers who “violated traffic
laws, trespassed on private property or invaded the privacy of
children at school.” 80 If given the opportunity, other tabloids, as
well as the paparazzi, may take a similar route. This would make
AB 381 a completely irrelevant statute.
4. Crying Foul: AB 381 Provides Celebrities with Special
Treatment
Another argument against AB 381 is that the law provides
celebrities with special treatment. Frank Griffin questioned the
motives for the law when he stated that “[t]his town lives off its
celebrities. . . . I do think [Assemblywoman Montañez] is someone
who is trying to climb on the bandwagon without doing proper
research thinking this bill is going to attract campaign
contributions from Paris Hilton and Angelina Jolie.” 81 AB 381
arguably provides celebrities with special treatment because the
law establishes disparate damage remedies for celebrities, whom
the paparazzi target, and the members of the general public who
are simply the residual victims in accidents caused by paparazzi
chases.
Under AB 381, Scarlett Johannson could recover general and
special damages from the paparazzo who caused her to side swipe
another car, plus disgorgement of any profits received from the
sale of photographs taken during the encounter. 82 Ms. Johannson
would also have a cause of action against the tabloid or agency that
directed the paparazzo to take the photographs. 83 However, the
woman and her two young daughters, in the car Ms. Johannson hit,
80

Us Weekly to Ban Reckless Paparazzi Shots, GUARDIAN UNLIMITED, June 14, 2005.
Jennifer Myers, Shuttering Paparazzi, 29 (3) NEWS MEDIA & THE L. 18, 2005
WLNR 14952105, July 1, 2005.
82
See supra notes 23–24 and accompanying text.
83
See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
81
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would only be able to recover for damages caused by the car
accident. 84
The supporters of AB 381 tout public safety as a justification
for the enactment of AB 381. 85 Nonetheless, some believe that the
unequal damage remedies available to the general public and to
celebrities imply that the law is motivated more by the desire to
garner celebrity favoritism through the further lining of celebrity
pockets, and possible lining of supporting politicians’ coffers, than
a desire to protect public safety. 86 Assemblywoman Montañez
acknowledged the fortuitousness of the circumstances when she
stated,
[t]here is no better situation than to have a Governor
who can look at a bill and be an eyewitness—and
personal witness—to exactly the crime that we’re
going after. . . . [W]e’re happy that the Governor
signed a law that would prevent future
celebrities . . . from becoming victims the way he
and his family were a couple years back. 87
C. Chilling the First Amendment and Frivolous Lawsuits
AB 381 creates further controversy because some believe that
it will be used to chill the First Amendment and create frivolous
lawsuits. According to the California Newspapers Publishers
Association, “[u]nder AB 381, newsworthy persons with a bone to
pick with the press will file frivolous lawsuits against journalists
and the newspapers that employ them in an attempt to chill the

84

See supra notes 22–24 and accompanying text.
Bill Hodgeman of the Los Angeles District Attorney’s office, which supports AB
381, stated, “[i]n certain instances the paparazzi photographers are violating California
criminal laws and my overarching concern about that is given this sort of behavior it
strikes me as inevitable that someone is going to get seriously hurt or killed.” Jennifer
Myers, Shuttering Paparazzi, 29 (3) NEWS MEDIA & THE L. 18, 2005 WLNR 14952105,
July 1, 2005.
86
Id.
87
Legislation That Puts a “Freeze-Frame” on Aggressive Paparazzi Signed by
Governor, CAL. ST. ASSEMBLY DEMOCRATIC CAUCUS, Oct. 3, 2005, http://democrats.
assembly.ca.gov/templates/ademmain.asp?articleid=293&zoneid=2.
85
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public’s right to know.” 88 Opponents argue that AB 381 will be
wrongfully employed by celebrities against the paparazzi and the
tabloids in an attempt to keep their names and faces off the racks at
supermarkets. 89 In addition, opponents argue that AB 381
threatens the First Amendment rights of mainstream journalists
because the law does not simply provide protections for celebrities
against the paparazzi. 90 Any individual involved in scandalous
behavior will have every incentive to misuse the statute. 91
II. TWO APPROACHES TO THE PRESS’S RIGHT TO GATHER NEWS
The jurisprudence regarding newsgathering torts greatly affects
the struggle to find a middle ground between celebrity privacy
rights and the rights of the paparazzi. Some courts take the
approach that “the tort taints the speech,” and thus place limits on
the press’s First Amendment right to gather news. 92 Other courts
take the approach that “the speech protects the tort,” and allow
members of the press to hide behind the First Amendment in the
event that tortious conduct occurs during the course of
newsgathering. 93 The approach taken by the California courts with
regard to newsgathering torts may ultimately determine the fate of
AB 381.

88

Letter from Thomas W. Newton, General Counsel, California Newpaper Publishers
Association, to Cindy Montañez, California State Assembly, Aug. 3, 2005, available at
http://www.cnpa.com/Leg/GA/Letters/05-06/AB381.htm.
89
See id.
90
See id.
91
Id.
News subjects involved in scandal, crime and government corruption have
every incentive to interfere with the newsgathering process and the public’s
right to know. AB 381 would provide criminals and others in the spotlight with
a powerful new tool to tie journalists and newspapers up in court in an attempt
to stop public exposure of their behavior. Essentially, AB 381 would create
liability whenever a reporter gets too close to a news subject and appears to
have the present ability to get even closer.
Id.
92
See infra Part II.B.
93
See infra Part II.C.
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A. The First Amendment Right to a Free Press
The First Amendment declares the right to a free press.94
Nonetheless, advocates of AB 381 argue that there should be limits
on the means by which information may be gathered and that the
paparazzi should not be permitted to use the First Amendment as a
shield to protect dangerous and harmful behavior. 95
The
constitutional guarantee of freedom of the press, however, does not
disappear simply because the reporting involves the publication of
a person’s name or likeness, potentially invading that person’s
privacy. 96 Instead, the law expands the press’s freedom to publish
information when the person whose name or likeness the press
seeks to publish is a celebrity. 97 Privacy jurisprudence indicates
that the paparazzi have every right to photograph celebrities
driving down Robertson Boulevard and drunkenly stumbling
outside the Roosevelt Hotel.98 Still, the paparazzi do not have a
completely unrestricted right to gather information about
celebrities simply by virtue of being members of the press. 99
The First Amendment gives the press the right to inform the
public about matters of legitimate public interest absent a
compelling state interest to the contrary. 100 Following this
reasoning, if information about a celebrity’s life is a matter of
94

U.S. CONST. amend. I, “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press.”
95
See AB 381 Bill Analysis, supra note 26.
96
See Eastwood v. Super. Ct. of L.A. County, 149 Cal. App. 3d 409, 421–22 (1983).
The court stated,
[f]reedom of the press is constitutionally guaranteed, and the publication of
daily news is an acceptable and necessary function in the life of the community.
The scope of the privilege extends to almost all reporting of recent events even
though it involves the publication of a purely private person’s name or likeness.
Id. at 422.
97
Id.
98
See supra notes 68–73.
99
See infra Part III.A–B.
100
See Smith v. Daily Mail Publ’g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979) (holding that the state
interest in protecting the identity of a juvenile offender could not justify the statute’s
imposition of criminal sanctions on the truthful publication of an alleged juvenile
delinquent’s name lawfully obtained by a newspaper). The Court stated, “if a newspaper
lawfully obtains truthful information about a matter of public significance then state
officials may not constitutionally punish publication of the information, absent a need to
further a state interest of the highest order.” Id.
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legitimate public interest and no compelling state interest justifies
the suppression of the information, then the First Amendment
should protect the paparazzi’s right to inform the public about such
a matter. However, because the courts distinguish between the
press’s right to publish news and the press’s right to gather news,
and afford the right to publish news greater First Amendment
protection, the right to inform the public does not equate to an
unrestrained right to obtain information. 101
B. The Tort Taints the Speech: Limiting the Press’s Right to
Gather News
Courts have recognized limits on the press’s right to gather
news. 102 The Dietemann court found that “[t]he First Amendment
has never been construed to accord newsmen immunity from torts
or crimes committed during the course of newsgathering. The
First Amendment is not a license to trespass, to steal, or to intrude
by electronic means into the precincts of another’s home or
office.” 103 The rulings that recognize limits on the press’s right to
gather news support imposing liability for newsgathering torts and
imply that the “tort taints the . . . speech.” 104
1. Federal Cases
Courts have determined that newsmen may not violate
generally applicable contract 105 or tort laws 106 in the name of the
101

See Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 496 (Cal. 1998). The court
stated, “the constitutional protection accorded newsgathering, if any, is far narrower than
the protection surrounding the publication of truthful material; consequently, the fact that
a reporter may be seeking ‘newsworthy’ material does not in itself privilege the
investigatory activity.” Id.
102
Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 669 (1991); Dietemann v. Time, Inc.,
449 F.2d 245, 249 (9th Cir. 1971).
103
Dietemann, 449 F.2d at 249.
104
See Andrew B. Sims, Food for the Lions: Excessive Damages For Newsgathering
Torts and the Limitations of Current First Amendment Doctrines, 78 B.U. L. REV. 507,
521–22 (1998) (arguing that the focus of the debate should not be on limiting media
liability for newsgathering torts but instead should be on preventing the award of
excessive damages for newsgathering torts). “If the argument . . . is, in effect, that the
speech should protect the tort, a contrary argument might be made that the tort ‘taints’ the
ensuing speech, stripping it of First Amendment protection.” Id.
105
See Cowles Media, 501 U.S. at 670.
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First Amendment. In Cohen v. Cowles Media, the United States
Supreme Court held that an informer was entitled to receive
compensatory damages from a publisher that breached its
confidentiality agreement with the source under a theory of
promissory estoppel. 107 In Dietemann v. Time, the Ninth Circuit
held that the First Amendment did not permit an individual to
invade another’s home with a hidden camera and concealed
electronic equipment simply because that individual was gathering
news. 108
The most famous case involving the paparazzi is Galella v.
Onassis, in which Jacqueline Kennedy Onassis obtained an
injunction against paparazzo Donald Galella after suing him for
harassment. 109 The Second Circuit upheld the injunction reasoning
that while Jackie Onassis was a public figure, and therefore subject
to news coverage, Galella’s “constant surveillance, his obtrusive
and intruding presence, was unwarranted and unreasonable.” 110
The Second Circuit acknowledged the limits on the press’s right to
gather news as well as the unique character of the paparazzi when
it stated, “[r]elief must be tailored to protect Mrs. Onassis from the
‘paparazzo’ attack which distinguishes Galella’s behavior from
that of other photographers.” 111 On the other hand, the court also
recognized that the injunction must not be broader than required
and should not “unnecessarily infringe on reasonable efforts to
‘cover’ Jackie Onassis.” 112 Not even American “royalty” could
gain absolute protection from the prying eyes of the paparazzi.

106

See Dietemann, 449 F.2d at 249.
See Cowles Media, 501 U.S. at 672. The Court stated, “generally applicable laws do
not offend the First Amendment simply because their enforcement against the press has
incidental effects on its ability to gather and report the news.” Id. at 669.
108
See Dietemann, 449 F.2d at 249, 252.
109
Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986, 991–92 (2d Cir. 1973).
110
Id. at 995.
111
Id. at 998.
112
Id.
107
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2. California Cases
California courts have also recognized limits on the press’s
right to gather news. 113 In KOVR-TV v. Superior Court, an action
against a television station for intentional infliction of emotional
distress, the Court of Appeal of California held that the First
Amendment did not protect a television news reporter’s on-camera
interview with three young children when, during the interview,
the reporter informed the children that two of their playmates had
been murdered by the playmates’ mother, who then committed
suicide. 114 The court explained,
[i]f indeed defendant sought to elicit an emotional
reaction from the minors for the voyeuristic
titillation of KOVR-TV’s viewing audience, this is
shameless exploitation of defenseless children, pure
and simple, not the gathering of news which the
public has a right to know. A free press is not
threatened by requiring its agents to operate within
the bounds of basic decency. 115
In Miller v. National Broadcasting Company, the Court of
Appeal of California held that First Amendment protection for
newsgathering did not immunize a television camera crew against
a wife’s action for invasion of privacy by intrusion when the crew
entered into her husband’s bedroom without consent during an
extremely sensitive time, due to her husband’s heart seizure. 116
The court reasoned that, in this instance, the obligation not to enter
private premises without permission did not place an
impermissible burden on newsgatherers, nor was it likely to have a
chilling effect on the First Amendment. 117

113
See KOVR-TV v. Super. Ct. of Sacramento County, 31 Cal. App. 4th 1023 (1995);
Miller v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 187 Cal. App. 3d 1463 (1986).
114
See KOVR-TV, 31 Cal. App. 4th at 1027, 1032.
115
Id. at 1032.
116
See Miller, 187 Cal. App. 3d at 1469, 1484.
117
Id. at 1492–93. The court stated,
the obligation not to make unauthorized entry into the private premises of
individuals like the Millers does not place an impermissible burden on
newsgatherers, nor is it likely to have a chilling effect on the exercise of First
Amendment rights. To hold otherwise might have extraordinarily chilling
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C. The Speech Protects the Tort: Cases Protecting the Press’s
Right to Gather News
While both the federal courts and the California courts have
held that the First Amendment does not shield newsmen from
punishment for torts committed in the newsgathering process, one
United States Supreme Court justice cautioned against
distinguishing between the right to publish news and the right to
gather news. In his dissent in Branzburg v. Hayes, Justice Stewart
warned that “[n]o less important to the news dissemination process
is the gathering of information. News must not be unnecessarily
cut off at its source, for without freedom to acquire information the
right to publish would be impermissibly compromised.” 118
Echoing Justice Stewart’s advice, some courts suggest that the
First Amendment provides the press with some level of protection
from liability for newsgathering torts, and support the argument
that the First Amendment should protect against liability for the
tort on an “anti-circumvention” theory. 119 Anti-circumvention
theory reasons that if speech is constitutionally protected, then the
courts should also protect the means of obtaining that speech if the
absence of protection would allow the plaintiff to circumvent the
First Amendment. 120
1. Federal Cases
In Desnick v. American Broadcasting Company, the producer
of ABC’s television show PrimeTime Live sent individuals manned
with concealed cameras to the offices of Desnick Eye Center.121
These individuals posed as patients, requested eye exams, and
secretly videotaped two ophthalmic surgeons. 122 The ABC
implications for all of us; instead of a zone of privacy protecting our secluded
moments, a climate of fear might surround us instead.
Id.
118

Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 728 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (holding that
the public interest in law enforcement and in ensuring effective grand jury proceedings
was not insufficient to override the consequential, but uncertain, burden on news
gathering).
119
See Sims, supra note 105, at 520–21.
120
Id. at 520–21.
121
44 F.3d 1345, 1347–48 (7th Cir. 1995).
122
Id.
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producer had originally told Dr. Desnick that PrimeTime Live
wanted to air a segment on large cataract practices. Based on this
information, Dr. Desnick permitted an ABC crew to film the
Center’s main office in Chicago, to film a cataract operation “live,”
and to interview doctors, technicians and patients. 123 However,
ABC actually produced and broadcasted a program on Medicare
fraud involving elderly patients undergoing unnecessary cataract
surgeries. 124 The Desnick Eye Center and the two surgeons caught
on film sued for defamation and trespass, among other torts. 125
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the lower court’s dismissal of the
plaintiffs’ trespass claim even though the “test patients” gained
access to the plaintiff’s premises by misrepresentation. 126 Judge
Posner implied that the First Amendment provides the press with
some level of protection from liability for newsgathering torts
when he stated that “[i]f the broadcast itself does not contain
actionable defamation, and no established rights are invaded in the
process of creating it . . . then the target has no legal remedy even
if the investigatory tactics used by the network are surreptitious,
confrontational, unscrupulous, and ungentlemanly.” 127
2. California Cases
California courts have also suggested that the First Amendment
provides the press with some protection from liability for
newsgathering torts. In Nicholson v. McClatchy Newspapers, the
Court of Appeal of California held that the press’s right to seek
information is protected so long as the journalists employ ordinary
newsgathering techniques. 128 The court stated, “the constitutional
123

Id.
Id. at 1348–49.
125
Id. at 1349.
126
Id. at 1351–55.
127
Id. at 1355.
128
Nicholson v. McClatchy Newspapers, 177 Cal. App. 3d 509, 519 (1986). The court
stated that ordinary newsgathering techniques included
asking persons questions, including those with confidential or restricted
information. While the government may desire to keep some proceedings
confidential and may impose the duty upon participants to maintain
confidentiality, it may not impose criminal or civil liability upon the press for
obtaining and publishing newsworthy information through routine reporting
techniques.
124
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protection accorded normal news-gathering activities does not
depend upon the characterization of the cause of action seeking to
impose sanctions upon its exercise,” implying that the State cannot
restrict the press’s right to gather news by creating laws that render
ordinary newsgathering techniques tortious. 129 In Anti-Defamation
League of B’Nai B’Rith v. Superior Court of the City and County
of San Francisco, the Court of Appeal of California held that the
First Amendment immunized journalists from liability for violating
a California statute imposing liability on individuals who
intentionally disclose information, that is otherwise not public,
which they know was obtained from personal information
maintained by the state or federal government. 130 The court stated,
“[we] do not believe the alleged unlawfulness of petitioners’
information-gathering activities is dispositive of their right to the
protection of the First Amendment,” implying that a journalist does
not automatically lose First Amendment protection when the
journalist commits a tort in the course of newsgathering. 131
The courts have yet to come to a consensus as to how much
protection, if any at all, should be provided to the press against
liability for newsgathering torts. 132 While some rulings indicate
that the First Amendment provides no protection for newsgathering
torts, 133 others suggest that in certain instances the First
Amendment will shield the press from liability.134

Id. at 519–20.
The court also stated, “[s]ince those activities are protected by the First Amendment, state
law may not impinge upon them by characterizing the activities as tortious.” Id. at 520.
129
Id. at 520.
130
Anti-Defamation League of B’Nai B’Rith v. Super. Ct. of the City and County of
S.F., 67 Cal. App. 4th 1072 (1998).
131
Id. at 1091. The court indicated, however, that a journalist’s First Amendment
protection against tort liability, when in fact applicable, only applied if the journalist was
acting as a journalist when committing the tort. The court stated, “[p]etitioners would be
entitled to that protection even if they did violate the statute, but only if they obtained,
used and disseminated the information at issue as journalists.” Id. (emphasis in the
original).
132
See supra Part II.
133
See supra Part II.B.
134
See supra Part II.C.
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III. SINGLED OUT: A THIRD APPROACH TO NEWSGATHERING TORTS
In determining whether to hold members of the press liable for
newsgathering torts, some courts refuse to impose liability on the
theory that the speech protects the tort, while others impose
liability on the grounds that the tort taints the speech. However,
courts should take an entirely different approach in determining
whether to impose liability for newsgathering torts. The Fourth
Circuit’s decision in Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC
indicates that a law imposing liability for newsgathering torts will
not survive a constitutional challenge if the law singles out the
press and specifically targets a limited portion of the media, unless
that law serves a compelling state interest that may not be achieved
in the absence of the legislation. 135 Under this approach, AB 381
would not survive a constitutional challenge.
A. The Standard
Judicial antipathy towards legislation that singles out the press
and specifically targets a limited portion of the media predates
Food Lion. In Minneapolis Star & Tribune v. Minnesota
Commissioner of Revenue, the United States Supreme Court
overturned a Minnesota use tax on ink and paper used in
publications. 136 While the State argued that the tax was part of the
generally applicable scheme of taxation, the Court determined that
the tax violated the First Amendment because the tax singled out
the press for differential treatment 137 and targeted a small group of
newspapers. 138 The Court stated, “differential treatment, unless

135

Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. 194 F.3d 505, 521–22 (4th Cir. 1999).
Minneapolis Star & Tribune v. Minn. Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 593
(1983).
137
Id. at 581. The Court stated,
Minnesota . . . has not chosen to apply its general sales and use tax to
newspapers. Instead, it has created a special tax that applies only to certain
publications protected by the First Amendment. Although the State argues now
that the tax on paper and ink is part of the general scheme of taxation, the use
tax provision . . . is facially discriminatory, singling out publications for
treatment that is, to our knowledge, unique in Minnesota law.
Id.
138
Id. at 591–92. The Court stated,
136
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justified by some special characteristic of the press, suggests that
the goal of the regulation is not unrelated to suppression of
expression, and such a goal is presumptively unconstitutional.” 139
In Pitt News v. Pappert, the Third Circuit struck down a
Pennsylvania law that banned advertisers from paying for alcoholic
beverage advertisements in media affiliated with universities. 140
The court stated that although combating underage or abusive
drinking was a compelling purpose, the State could employ means
that would be far more direct and effective and would not infringe
on First Amendment rights. 141 The Third Circuit warned, “courts
must be wary that taxes, regulatory laws, and other laws that
impose financial burdens are not used to undermine freedom of the
press and freedom of speech.” 142 However, the Third Circuit,
citing Minneapolis Star & Tribune, affirmed the understanding that
the states and the federal government may subject the media to
generally applicable laws without offending the Constitution. 143
While not all laws that single out the press or a small group of
speakers will ultimately be held unconstitutional, such laws are
presumptively invalid. 144 Significantly, the law need not represent
a purposeful attempt to restrict First Amendment activities in order
to be presumptively unconstitutional. 145 Instead, the presumption
Minnesota’s ink and paper tax violates the First Amendment not only because it
singles out the press, but also because it targets a small group of newspapers.
The effect of the $100,000 exemption enacted in 1974 is that only a handful of
publishers pay any tax at all, and even fewer pay any significant amount of
tax. . . . Whatever the motive of the legislature in this case, we think that
recognizing a power in the State not only to single out the press but also to
tailor the tax so that it singles out a few members of the press presents such a
potential for abuse that no interest suggested by Minnesota can justify the
scheme.
Id.
139

Id. at 585.
379 F.3d 96 (3rd Cir. 2004).
141
Id. at 106, 108.
142
Id. at 110.
143
Id.
144
Id. at 111.
145
Id. (citing Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 437, 448 (1991), which held that a state
law that imposed a sales tax on cable television services while excluding and exempting
other segments of the media was constitutional because the tax was not directed at, nor
presented any danger of suppressing particular ideas).
140
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applies if the law is “structured so as to raise suspicion” of the
intent to impede expression protected by the First Amendment. 146
In Minneapolis Star & Tribune, the United States Supreme
Court applied the force of the First Amendment to overturn a
facially discriminatory tax. 147 The Court, however, did not limit
its holding to tax laws, and thus created the opportunity to strike
down other types of legislation that appeared to be facially
discriminatory. 148 While the Fourth Circuit in Food Lion did not
use Minneapolis Star & Tribune to strike down facially
discriminatory legislation, the Fourth Circuit did suggest that the
First Amendment protects journalists from liability for torts
committed during the newsgathering process if the tort in question
singles out the press and specifically targets a portion of the
media. 149 In Food Lion, the Fourth Circuit distinguished laws of
general applicability from laws that single out and target the
press. 150 If the decision in Food Lion were followed in California,
the First Amendment would not shield the paparazzi from liability
under California’s general assault law, but the First Amendment
would provide protection against discriminatory laws such as AB
381.

146

Pitt News, 379 F.3d at 111; Leathers, 499 U.S. at 448.
Minneapolis Star & Tribune v. Minn. Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 593
(1983).
148
The Court did this by using general language which struck down as unconstitutional
laws which singled out the press without a compelling state interest which justified the
burden imposed on the press. Id. at 585.
149
Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. 194 F.3d 505, 521–22 (4th Cir. 1999).
The Fourth Circuit also stated,
[t]he key inquiry in Cowles was whether the law of promissory estoppel was a
generally applicable law. The Court began its analysis with some examples of
generally applicable laws that must be obeyed by the press, such as those
relating to copyright, labor, antitrust, and tax. . . . The torts Dale and Barnett
committed, breach of the duty of loyalty and trespass, fit neatly into the Cowles
framework. Neither tort targets or singles out the press. . . . Here, as in Cowles,
heightened scrutiny does not apply because the tort laws (breach of duty of
loyalty and trespass) do not single out the press or have more than an incidental
effect upon its work.
Id.
150
Id.
147
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B. The Standard Applied to AB 381
Supporters of AB 381 may argue that it is a generally
applicable law that does not apply solely to members of the press
but would also apply to the crazed fan who chases down a celebrity
in a car as a means to obtain that celebrity’s photograph. However,
the law’s disgorgement provisions provide strong support for the
notion that AB 381 singles out the press and specifically targets the
paparazzi. 151 Certainly, in theory, a fan may sell a picture to the
tabloids and be subject to AB 381’s disgorgement provisions as a
consequence. Nonetheless, California did not enact AB 381 to
protect celebrities from such fans. 152 The State enacted AB 381 to
deter and punish those individuals who capture celebrities’ images
purely as a means to turn a profit. 153 Furthermore, the State
tailored AB 381 to apply specifically to the actions of the
paparazzi and not to the actions of mainstream journalists.154
According to the California Newspaper Publishers Association,
AB 381 “makes those engaged in First Amendment protected
activities susceptible to special penalties for which the rest of
society is exempt.” 155 Like Minnesota’s use tax on paper and ink,
AB 381 should be considered discriminatory on its face. 156 Under
the Court’s decision in Minneapolis Star & Tribune, in order for a
statute that singles out the press for differential treatment to
survive a constitutional challenge, the State’s interest must be “of
compelling importance that it cannot achieve” without the
regulation. 157 In other words, the regulation must satisfy the “strict
scrutiny” standard of review. 158

151

Cal. Civ. Code § 1708.8(d) (2006); see supra note 24.
See AB 381 Bill Analysis, supra note 26; supra note 26 and accompanying text.
153
AB 381 Bill Analysis, supra note 26.
154
Id.
155
See Letter from Thomas W. Newton, General Counsel, California Newpaper
Publishers Association, to Cindy Montañez, California State Assembly, Aug. 3, 2005,
available at http://www.cnpa.com/Leg/GA/Letters/05-06/AB381.htm.
156
Minneapolis Star & Tribune v. Minn. Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 581
(1983).
157
Id. at 585.
158
See Arkansas Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 198, 231 (1987) (holding
that Arkansas’ regulation that selectively applied sales tax to certain forms of
publications was unconstitutional). The Court stated that in order to justify differential
152
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AB 381 raises a presumption of unconstitutionality because it
singles out the press and specifically targets the paparazzi. As the
Third Circuit found in Pitt News, “[o]nce the presumption of
unconstitutionality arises, it can be overcome only by showing that
the challenged law is needed to serve a compelling interest.” 159
AB 381 threatens to chill the First Amendment. 160 The threat to
free expression outweighs any interests asserted by the State and
other advocates to justify the law’s enactment. AB 381 will not
pass a strict scrutiny test because the statute does not serve a
compelling interest that cannot be protected without the
regulation. 161 AB 381 is an unnecessary and unreasonable law
because there is a limited market for pictures obtained through
dangerous tactics. 162 In addition, the paparazzi may be restrained
through means that do not implicate the First Amendment because
celebrities can rely on current assault law, which already provides
adequate protection, 163 and the tabloids can police themselves. 164
The State’s interests in protecting celebrity privacy, celebrity
safety and public safety therefore cannot on their own justify the
differential treatment of the paparazzi. 165

treatment, “the State must show that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state
interest and is narrowly drawn to achieve that end.” Id.
159
Pitt News v. Pappert, 379 F.3d 96, 111 (3d Cir. 2004).
160
See supra Part I.C.
161
See supra Part I.C; Minneapolis Star & Tribune v. Minn. Comm’r of Revenue, 460
U.S. 575, 585 (1983).
162
See supra Part I.B.2.
163
See supra notes 66–67 and accompanying text.
164
See supra Part I.B.3.
165
Minneapolis Star & Tribune, 460 U.S. at 586. The Court stated,
The main interest asserted by Minnesota in this case is the raising of revenue.
Of course that interest is critical to any government. Standing alone, however,
it cannot justify the special treatment of the press, for an alternative means of
achieving the same interest without raising concerns under the First
Amendment is clearly available: the State could raise the revenue by taxing
businesses generally, avoiding the censorial threat implicit in a tax that singles
out the press.
Id.
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CONCLUSION
In 1960, Federico Fellini released his much celebrated film La
Dolce Vita. The word “paparazzi” derives from a character in
Fellini’s film, a photographer named “Paparazzo.” 166 In Italian,
the word “paparazzo” means “sparrow.” 167 Fellini reportedly gave
the character this moniker because he believed that the press
photographers who hounded celebrities looked like “little hungry
birds.” 168 Almost half a century later, a much lesser known
director released a much less celebrated film entitled Paparazzi. 169
In Paparazzi, the main paparazzi character, Rex Harper, indicates
that while so much has changed in the almost half century since the
release of Fellini’s film (and over a full century since Warren and
Brandeis’ prophetic statements), so much remains the same. 170
Harper states, “[t]he public wants raw and real and that’s what we
give ’em. Let me tell you something, my friends, we’re the last of
the real hunters.” 171
Courts have searched for a middle ground between celebrities’
right to privacy and the press’s right to gather information about
celebrities for almost as long as celebrities have existed. While no
members of the press, including the paparazzi, are completely
immune from liability for torts committed in the process of
gathering news, Food Lion indicates that tort laws that single out
the press for differential treatment and specifically target a limited
portion of the media will not survive a First Amendment
challenge. 172 In passing AB 381, California attempted to restrain
the overly aggressive paparazzi. Nonetheless, if the Ninth Circuit
were to follow the Fourth Circuit’s opinion in Food Lion, AB 381
166

See Internet Movie Database, Trivia for La Dolce Vita, http://www.imdb.com/
title/tt0053779/trivia (last visited Apr. 22, 2006).
167
Id.
168
Id.
169
See Internet Movie Data Base, Paparazzi, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0338325/ (last
visited Apr. 22, 2006).
170
See Internet Movie Data Base, Plot Summary for Paparazzi, http://www.imdb.com/
title/tt0338325/plotsummary.
171
See Internet Movie Data Base, Memorable Quotes From Paparazzi,
http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0338325/quotes (last visited Apr. 22, 2006).
172
See Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. 194 F.3d 505, 521–22 (4th Cir.
1999).
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would not survive a constitutional challenge, and therefore the
State of California would have to find another way to hunt the
hunters.

